This proposal aims to restore and stabilize AssangeDAO’s governance operations by continuing the current off-chain governance model and updating the list of active proposers and multisig signers.
Due to the absence of available technical contributors and the complexity of implementing fully on-chain governance (e.g. via Tally), the transition to a new system must be postponed. However, the DAO must not remain stagnant while waiting for this transition.
To move forward, this proposal includes:
Continuing with the existing Snapshot-based governance process;
Appointing the current five GTU members as both official Snapshot proposers and Gnosis Safe multisig signers;
Removing inactive or unresponsive proposers and multisig members who are no longer contributing to the DAO;
Empowering the community to initiate forum discussions and votes to remove or replace any proposer or signer who neglects their responsibilities.
This ensures DAO continuity, operational clarity, and shared accountability as we prepare for longer-term governance upgrades.
Proposal Details
Technical & Implementation Plan
Governance will continue via Snapshot using 1-token-1-vote.
DAO funds will remain secured in the existing Gnosis Safe.
The following five active GTU members will be added as both proposers and multisig signers:
Gabriel Shipton
Silke Noa
BZ
Zylo
Logan
All inactive or unresponsive proposers and multisig signers will be removed to ensure timely execution of proposals and reduce governance bottlenecks. Additionally, both Amir and Rose remained active in the community and made meaningful contributions throughout last year. Therefore, it is recommended that they retain their roles as multisig signers and proposal authors. Their continued involvement could help ensure continuity and bring valuable experience to the DAO during this transitional phase.
A community post will record the updated proposer and multisig list with wallet addresses.
Alignment with Julian (Consensus Unit)
This proposal maintains the role of the Consensus Unit (Julian’s family) as a safeguard with veto power over major proposals.
The existing off-chain model will continue to respect this structure while enabling daily governance to function.
Communication & Moderation
A dedicated thread on the DAO forum will allow community members to:
Track multisig/proposer activity
Raise concerns or recommend replacements
If a proposer or signer is inactive or unresponsive, the community can initiate a vote to remove or replace them via forum + Snapshot.
Moderation duties remain unchanged, under AIP-12 guidelines.
Terms, Eligibility & Responsibility Structure
Role
Eligibility
Term Limit
Key Responsibilities
Removal Conditions
Proposer
Active in governance; forum participation in past 60 days
12 months (renewable via vote)
Draft & submit proposals; respond to community feedback
Inactive > 60 days or ignores community
Multisig Signer
DAO participation; prior public contribution or vetting
12 months (renewable via vote)
Execute passed Snapshot proposals within 5 days
Fails to sign ≥2 proposals; no response >60 days
Consensus Unit
Members of Assange’s family or appointed rep
Indefinite
Veto major proposals if deemed harmful to Assange or mission
Not removable under current model
GTU Member
Trusted community member, selected via AIP-12
Until transition to new governance
Oversee transition; propose governance reforms
May be dissolved by future AIP
All rights and responsibilities will be recorded in a pinned forum thread titled “DAO Roles and Responsibilities Register.”
Governance Framework Going Forward
Daily governance will remain Snapshot + Gnosis Safe based.
Proposals that involve major treasury changes or legal risks will require:
Community vote via Snapshot
5-of-7 Gnosis Safe signer execution
No veto raised by Consensus Unit within 72 hours
The community can propose (via forum + Snapshot) to add or remove signers/proposers at any time.
Voting Options
Yes – Temporarily continue using the off-chain governance model (Snapshot + Multisig), while continuing to explore and prepare for a transition to secure on-chain governance in the future. Update the list of proposers and multisig signers to include the five current GTU members, and remove inactive participants.
No – Do not update the governance system or signer list at this time.
Do all five candidates need to disclose their true information? It is always known that multiple signatures hold the keys to public funds at the same time, how do we trust the anonymous participants and how do we make sure they don’t abuse their power.
Also is it necessary to count the weight they hold in this vote and in future votes where the community asks for their removal?
This option seems to mean no on-chain governance in the future, but the proposal says keep seeking on-chain governance.
Keep the number of multisignatures remains at only five but not more, which is not safe in some ways! If three multisignatures strike or are no longer active the treasury will never be able to be reactivated because it’s not like a bank that can reactivate an account through developer intervention.
Addressing bottlenecks does not mean sacrificing safety!
Regular Meetings: Holding consistent meetings with key proposers and multisig members allows the community to gauge their engagement.
Monthly Proposal Periods: Designating a specific time, such as the last week of each month, for proposal submissions provides a clear window to assess participation.
Social Media Promotion: Active promotion of the DAO on social media by multisigs and proposers serves as an indicator of their involvement.
Forum Participation: Regular attendance and contributions in the DAO’s forum offer another way for the community to evaluate their commitment.
When community governance is at a standstill, those who take concrete steps to advance governance implementation deserve our highest praise. I wish to express my appreciation and support - we must go beyond mere discussion and empty talk, and focus on actual implementation. When raising issues, please also propose solutions.
Currently there are numerous matters that appear simple yet overwhelming to tackle. We should start implementing them one by one from the least contentious areas. Governance improvement cannot be achieved overnight but requires gradual iteration - this should become community consensus. Any expectation that a single proposal can solve all problems is unrealistic, especially without strong leadership to drive progress.
Many multisigers and proposers have been absent for over three years without returning. Removing these individuals from the lists is already community consensus - let’s implement this immediately.
Amir and Rose stood with the community during its most difficult times and deserve our respect. Although they’ve left due to disagreements, I propose retaining their multisiger positions, and the community should always welcome them back.
The current GTU members represent community consensus and have earned collective recognition. I believe those not currently serving as multisigers should be added as multisigers and proposers. This would mark a significant achievement during the transition period, as everything we do now prepares for normal governance later. Establishing community-authorized legitimate multisigers and proposers will complete the prototype of governance.
Regarding governance tools, we should continue using Snapshot. Last year’s discussions on this issue directly led to community division and stagnation. Currently we lack the resources and consensus to change this. Those who oppose should take the lead in advancing this matter and submit proposals.
The issue of holding core members accountable for inaction has troubled us for too long. Accountability and incentives are two sides of the same coin. I believe it’s difficult to address multiple issues in a single proposal - this requires a separate proposal for discussion.
In conclusion, I support Logan’s proposal. We cannot afford another year of endless discussion without implementation. Our community needs to move items from our "to do list” to our “done” list.
The discussion about adding multiple signatures and proposal authors took place in the old forum. This discussion prefers to hire well-known people with a social background. The position of managing the keys to tens of millions of dollars of public assets is not for the average person, especially an unknown and anonymous person. Background vetting of additional multi-signatures and proposal authors seems critical, which may also take additional effort and time.
This proposal doesn’t really address the real problem of DAOs and doesn’t prevent from being attacked. Instead, it increases the risk.
When community members don’t even trust Wau Holland, a registered entity in one of the most highly regulated countries in the world, how can we trust these individuals with even a basic background and no laws that can regulate them?
The main safeguard here is the Consensus Unit - which is why it must always include a lawyer such as Silke Noa ie a person with a strong Legal/Financial background.
How does Snapshot prevent something like a Sybil attack (non-technical explanation please).
In decentralized systems, anonymity can be acceptable.but only if they earn the community’s trust through transparency, consistent contribution, and clear accountability mechanisms.also these five candidates do have true information that is public.
exclude affected parties from voting on proposals about their own position
The “Yes” vote does not mean giving up on on-chain governance altogether — it simply means continue with off-chain governance for now, while we work toward implementing a more robust on-chain system later.
the wording may be confusing,I will revise it now
Like @sudongpo said.Amir and Rose stood with the community during its most difficult times and deserve our respect,we can keep their positions.
This proposal was submitted because I saw no concrete progress on implementing on-chain governance. In my view, this is the most practical and immediate way to break the deadlock.
We need to move beyond endless discussions and focus on real execution. It’s easy to say “let’s hire well-known professionals” — but who will actually take the lead and make that happen? And are “well-known figures” really more trustworthy? In the crypto space, some of the biggest scams have been led by so-called “reputable experts.”
This proposal suggests assigning responsibility only to currently active, trusted GTU members — individuals with a long-standing track record in the DAO and no history of misconduct. They are not anonymous strangers; they’re visible, known, and have proven their commitment through action.
As for Wau Holland: why should we blindly trust them? This is DAO-owned capital — raised by the community — and it was never meant to be permanently controlled by a third party. The community was promised transparency, but WHF has yet to publish a complete financial report after almost one year. Trust must be earned, not assumed, especially when it comes to managing tens of millions in public funds.
So again, this proposal isn’t perfect — it’s practical. It’s designed to help us move forward while continuing to work on longer-term, more robust governance solutions.
I am not sure about the tenure of those roles. How far does it extend - I think that should be included. The DAO could consider 12 months - is that fair if that proposal was successful.
After governance gets fixed - the next two priorities would be to address the unused funds issue re Wau Holland and selecting one or two project ideas to receive funds and boost morale. Given the labor shortage issue - that too may have to be explored.
I wish others would start speaking up. What do others think apart from the three responding??? Do you really want the whole debate to be dominated by a tiny handful of people. Thats dangerous!!! Im going silent now.
I don’t think it’s appropriate to urge others to stop discussing a topic, that’s not what democracy looks like.
I’d like to remind that E was behaving very normally before he became a multi-signatory, and he even organized a huge community to support Free Assange. But who can guarantee that he was act against his purpose when he becomes a multi-signatory? “Execution” is not the fundamental issue here, “trust” is!
Especially when people say things like “why should we trust the WH” when the juicebox phase clearly informs us about the whole process, and when people want to speculate on tokens despite the legal risks even after the core mission has been clarified. What’s the point of trusting anything?
In good conscience, you have no idea how distrustful people once were of the consensus unit.
Regardless, the proposal creates more risk. And it makes no sense to add positions; snapshot still works fine at this stage.
Stop nitpicking over words — you know exactly what I mean, and this kind of semantic game is just tiresome.
Are we really going to rehash the fundraising issue again? If it was truly about pure donations, why dive into the crypto world? Why issue a token at all? Isn’t it just a way to exploit people’s expectations of a payoff to rake in money? And after the first round of fundraising, why go for a second? Would you have raised that much with pure donations ? Don’t act innocent—it’s just exploiting legal loopholes.
Also,The JUSTICE token was marketed as a governance token. But in three years, has there been any real governance? No — just silence, locked proposals, and community frustration
You’re free not to trust anyone. You’re free to ignore what’s happening. trust isn’t decided by one person — it’s something that comes from the entire collective.
Is there a problem at the fundraising stage? Did you get into the community because it makes you money, rather than reading the purpose clearly stated on juicebox? I’m not going to argue any further on this issue, people’s mental expectations of what they will get are contrary to the facts, and people can’t be forced to change the stated goals to their mental cues.
Tokens may have new uses in new phases, but in any case we have accomplished our core mission and are looking at ways to empower tokens even more.
After GTU members become community consensus and are granted legitimacy by the community, there are still people who have doubts about legality and enforceability, which violates the process. If GTU members cannot become multisigner and proposers, then what should the community do? Why do we need consensus units?
The transitional stage is about building for normal governance in the future, and never forget this original intention.
Blindly believing in well-known figures and institutions is foolish. Assange has been exposing their illegal behavior throughout his life, and even the 2008 financial crisis was fueled by the three major rating agencies. The WHS still has no recognized transparency report. How can we believe it?
Who would be willing to come to DAO? What’s the benefit of such chaos? What else do you dare not do against the community if those who uphold legitimacy internally are not trusted? How about GB let you handle the multiple signings and we all leave.
Those who are not recognized by the community are always another E blinded by the consensus unit, and in this regard, the community sees it more clearly than the consensus unit. The people who are still talking about democracy have ulterior motives. What the community lacks is not this, but responsible and powerful figures. The Assange family is lacking in this regard.
I’m afraid what you want is to continue discussing for a few more years and stir up any pushing behavior from those who want to do things
Everyone else has left, only a few of us are discussing blindly here, and we are all tired. This kind of democracy is boring. According to the process, GTU will discuss in four weeks and give everyone a conclusion. I want to see if GB really abides by the transitional phase agreement? Which principle violated the consensus unit and was rejected, and what are the guiding opinions? I hope this is not a game where GB is fooling everyone.
No — it was perfectly executed. Is that what you want to hear? Fine.
I joined because I believed it could help Assange gain his freedom. And yes, if there was also a chance for a return while supporting that cause, of course that would be ideal. That doesn’t seem like it’s any of your business, frankly.
But let’s not pretend the majority of contributors joined purely out of altruism. Most people contributed to the Juicebox campaign hoping for a return, especially given the success of PeopleDAO — it created an expectation. That was the context of the time.
I don’t even want to keep discussing this topic — but you’re the one who brought it up again.
After the DEV of ConstitutionDAO voluntarily withdrew and renamed the DAO handover community to peopleDAO did have a lot of success in driving the token price up, other than that I’m not sure what other successes you’re implying they had? peopleDAO has been inactive for a long time.
If anyone wants JUSTICE to work, isn’t it working in that direction now? Why not recognize what DAO has accomplished in the first phase, instead of blaming the unjustified.
So you think you can trust Totally Anonymous? Trust them to selflessly control the keys to the treasury? Security is not only important to me, it’s just as important to you!
I’d also like you to explain why you’re worried about the security issues that come with decentralized platforms, but not the security risks of anonymous people?
You don’t like the fact that there are opposing views here?
The fact is your comments are full of psychological innuendo, which can be misleading. Let community members against the consensus unit and against the fair history of DAO!
Would you stay at home because of the possibility of a plane crash or a car accident when you go out? If everything is risky, then do nothing? Please provide a solution and submit a proposal. Apart from causing community disputes and hindering community development, I don’t see how you can help DAO! You will only keep the conflict here, I think this is what you have been doing for the past few years, becoming another E. Why are you not recognized here all year round, constantly arguing with people? Is this kind of life meaningful?
You overemphasize the ideal and reject the token economy, as well as the efforts of Gabriel and Zylo to address liquidity and listing on more exchanges. Why don’t you go to the Assange Campain? Everywhere is idealistic, and no one talks about the token economy, which aligns with your values.
Obviously, when someone who makes everyone feel disgusted talks to me about ideals, I just want to vomit. it’s okay to first become a recognized person, and then your ideas.If you spend our days expressing various opposing opinions without any actionable proposals, and making sarcastic remarks about others’ actions, we don’t need such people
Is there any other DAO that’s been inactive for as long as ours? Have you even participated in PeopleDAO yourself? On what basis are you claiming it’s been inactive for a long time?
No one is denying that AssangeDAO achieved success in helping to secure Assange’s release — don’t twist words or take things out of context.
And regarding “E”: from the start, he branded himself as a passionate supporter of Assange in order to gain trust, while hiding his true intentions. disregarding facts and lacking empathy,all to pander to the family. His true intentions remained hidden until he secured that trust—people like this are truly dangerous. because you never know what they’re actually after.
The family should be wary of such individuals.When someone masks their real motives behind a noble cause, that’s far more concerning than someone who is openly self-interested.
Summary
Proposal Details
Technical & Implementation Plan
Alignment with Julian (Consensus Unit)
Communication & Moderation
Terms, Eligibility & Responsibility Structure
All rights and responsibilities will be recorded in a pinned forum thread titled “DAO Roles and Responsibilities Register.”
Governance Framework Going Forward
Voting Options
No – Do not update the governance system or signer list at this time.
Keep the number of multisignatures remains at only five but not more, which is not safe in some ways! If three multisignatures strike or are no longer active the treasury will never be able to be reactivated because it’s not like a bank that can reactivate an account through developer intervention.