Proposal: Multisig Signer Selection Framework and Charter Implementation

General
1

Proposal: Multisig Signer Selection Framework and Charter Implementation

Summary

To follow up on the requirements of AIP-4 for formalizing multisig management, this proposal introduces a complete framework for selecting and managing DAO multisig signers. It can be ensure the security, integrity, and effective functioning of the DAO treasury and governance operations, while minimizing the risk of collusion or attack. At the same time, this proposal introduces a Multisig Signer Charter, which clearly defines the responsibilities, duties, rules of conduct, and removal process for signers. This ensures that signers act according to the will of the community and remain accountable.

Proposal Details

PART 1

Multisig Signer Selection Plan

1. Overview

To ensure secure and transparent treasury operations, this plan outlines the selection, appointment, removal, and replacement of DAO multisig signers. The DAO will appoint 7 multisig signers, with a 3-of-7 signature threshold. The process is open, KYC-compliant, and incorporates a backup signer mechanism.

2. Nomination Stage

2.1 Self-nomination or Community Nomination

• Any DAO member may self-nominate or nominate others (with their consent).

• Nominations are submitted publicly, typically on the DAO forum.

2.2 Composition

• No more than two Multisigs may be from the same country.

• No more than two Multisigs may be from the same community/organization.

2.3 Application Requirements

Candidates must submit:

• Real name

• Nationality

• Affiliated Community/Organization

• Contact info (Telegram/email/X)

• Wallet address

• Area(s) of Professional Expertise

• Alignment with Julian

• Personal bio and motivation

• Disclosure of conflicts of interest (e.g., participation in other multisigs)

All applications are publicly viewable for transparency and community review.

3. KYC & Due Diligence

3.1 Identity Verification (KYC)

• All nominees must undergo KYC verification via community Public Verification or a designated DAO-verified provider.

• Anonymous signers are not permitted to prevent sybil risk and ensure regulatory compliance.

3.2 Background Check

• A background screening will assess criminal history, fraud allegations, financial misconduct, and reputation.

• Candidates with confirmed high-risk behavior or conflicts of interest may be disqualified.

• Consensus Unit has the authority and obligation to conduct background checks on candidates.

3.3 Final Approval List

• A shortlist of qualified, verified candidates is published prior to voting.

• Candidates may choose to disclose full names or use pseudonyms, but identities must be verifiably known to the DAO admin team or auditor.

4. Community Voting

4.1 Candidate Introduction & AMA

Candidates are expected to participate in public Q&A sessions (e.g. AMA or forum posts) to explain qualifications, views, and community alignment.

4.2 Voting Process

The DAO votes using Snapshot or on-chain governance.

4.3 Result Announcement

The results of the vote will be announced by the proposer at the Forum.

5. Appointment & Onboarding

5.1 Acceptance and Announcement

• Elected signers confirm acceptance.

• A public announcement confirms the new signer list.

5.2 Smart Contract Integration

• Governance team updates the multisig contract (e.g. Gnosis Safe) to add new signer addresses and remove outgoing ones.

• Transaction must be signed by current signers to complete authorization.

5.3 Oath and Orientation

• New signers are required to acknowledge the Multisig Signer Charter, confirming their commitment to duties and community service.

• Orientation includes operational guidance, signing protocols, security standards, and access to signer communications.

6. Governance and Amendments

• This plan may be amended by governance proposal and majority vote.

• Reviews are conducted annually to reflect changes in DAO size, treasury structure, or legal compliance needs.

• All current and future signers must agree to this plan as part of their mandate.

PART 2

Multisig Signer Charter

Chapter 1: Scope and Definitions

Article 1

This charter applies to all multisig wallet signers (“Multisig Signers”) responsible for managing DAO treasury and executing governance decisions.

Article 2

A Multisig Signer is a community-authorized individual entrusted with executing approved proposals, securing assets, and maintaining DAO operational integrity.

Chapter 2: Rights and Obligations

Article 3 – Core Responsibilities

  1. Execute proposals approved by community governance.

  2. Secure private keys and signing devices.

  3. Participate in signing tasks in a timely manner.

  4. Respond to emergencies and support contingency actions.

Article 4 – Prohibitions

  1. Unauthorized transactions or actions.

  2. Abuse of privileges for personal gain.

  3. Long-term inactivity or signature refusal.

  4. Concealment of identity or undisclosed conflicts of interest.

Chapter 3: Security Obligations

Article 5 – Key Management

• Use hardware wallets or equivalent secure storage.

• Safely back up seed phrases offline.

• Never delegate signing duties to others.

Article 6 – Signing Protocols

• Verify address, amount, and purpose before signing.

• Document and disclose all executed transactions.

Chapter 4: Transparency and Accountability

Article 7 – Disclosure

• Provide identity, nationality, affiliations, and any conflicts of interest.

• Publish regular transaction summaries and operational reports.

Article 8 – Term and Replacement

• Term: 3 years, renewable.

• Signers may be removed at any time through governance proposals.

• Voluntary resignation requires notice and key revocation.

Article 9 – Automatic Removal Triggers

• Resignation.

• Criminal conviction.

• Proven or attempted treasury abuse.

• Verified collusion with anti-DAO entities or actors.

Article 10 – Community-Initiated Removal

• Any DAO member may propose to remove a signer based on:

• Misconduct

• Repeated inactivity

• Security breach

• Proven conflict with DAO values or Alignment with Julian

• Proposal follows regular governance vote thresholds.

Chapter 5: Incentives and Legal Protection

Article 11 – Incentives

• May receive token-based rewards or gas fee reimbursements.

• Incentives must be disclosed and governance-approved.

Article 12 – Legal Liability Waiver

• DAO shall provide indemnity for Multisig Signers acting in good faith and compliance.

• DAO may use legal wrappers such as LLCs or trusts to shield signers from personal liability.

Chapter 6: Final Clauses

Article 13

This charter is binding upon governance approval for all current and future Multisig Signers.

Article 14

Any amendments require a formal governance proposal and community approval.

Attack Mitigation

Requiring verified, public identity raises the potential cost and legal risk of malicious behavior. Restricting Multisigs to no more than two per country or community/organization mitigates risks of internal collusion and strengthens global diversity, it maximizes decentralization of the multi-sig team and avoids concentration of power.

Alignment with Julian

Establishing clear standards and procedures for the selection of Multisigs is an essential part of the DAO’s ongoing governance agenda. This process is a key step toward improving DAO operations and ensuring the proper implementation of governance decisions. By doing so, the DAO can better ensure that proposals aligned with the core values and mission of Julian Assange are effectively executed.

Conclusion

This proposal will help the DAO establishes a robust, transparent, and secure process for electing its Official Multisigs. This proposal empowers the community to select qualified stewards, mitigates attack vectors, and preserves the integrity of our collective mission.

Voting Options

Yes – Approve the Proposal

Approve the Multisig Signer Selection Plan and the Multisig Signer Charter.

No – Reject the Proposal

Do not proceed with the proposed multisig signer selection plan or charter.

Abstain

I choose not to take a position on this proposal.

2

  1. With less than 10 daily active users in the forum and only 5467 $justice holders, so many cumbersome requirements have directly discouraged people, and participants have taken on too many obligations. Obviously, this proposal has no possibility of being implemented. The timing is not right. We can choose this proposal when the daily active users in the forum exceed 100 and the $justice holders reach tens of thousands, but not now.

  2. AssangeDAO is now a dying project with a very poor reputation, without money and even basic governance. being abandoned by the crypto community without any attention,What we need is down-to-earth proposals that can be implemented, not unrealistic perfect solutions.

  3. In Logan’s proposal, everyone has been discussing for a month, and the consensus among most people is that GTU members become both multi signatories and proposers. The GTU members generated after more than a month of discussion are the largest consensus in the community. From a procedural perspective, a proposal will be formed soon, and BZ will be promoted to formal multi signatories, while Logan will be a temporary. The two will become proposers and the community will vote to decide.

  4. We don’t need to discuss for a few more months, release proposals, and let the community vote to decide, @Gabriel Do you want community governance to be indefinitely postponed? The patience of the community is also limited. within the rules, we discussed for four weeks, and GTU discuss for two weeks. It’s time to come to a conclusion. If the community feels fooled, no one will play with you anymore.

3

Hi, friend. If you want to discuss the details of the proposal and how it can be modified, you are more than welcome to do so.
It’s just that Logan’s proposal lacks foundation. a DAO needs systems at all times to ensure its healthy operation. Security is also essential at any stage. And his proposal is just a proposal about electing more signers, it lacks the premise of governance. And this piece of my proposal lays the groundwork for exactly that, it is a proposal about governance.

4

  1. Not trusting the choices made by the community and the Assange family is not the intention of the community, it is just your personal wishful thinking. The community is willing to grant legitimacy and take responsibility for the results.The new plan is tantamount to once again showing distrust of the community.

  2. Your plan is to start over and establish another consensus candidate. We cannot waste a few more months accompanying you to create an uncertain consensus. Any candidate outside of GTU will not receive support from the community, and I will fully oppose it.

  3. Disagreements are irreconcilable, and saying the same thing too much is useless. I strongly oppose your proposal and will submit it to the community for voting.
    @Gabriel will not refuse to take a plane due to reports of a plane crash. He should believe in his own vision and the choices of the community.

5

So why don’t you want to set rules for the people who manage public assets? On what basis will we elect them? How will we define their duties and rights? How will we avoid theft from the treasury? Apparently it only takes three more signatures colluding with them to transfer money from the treasury into their wallets. This is not alarmist talk.
A community without rules then who will have the power of interpretation?

6

I appreciate your willingness to contribute to the DAO and push for change—it’s far more constructive than simply opposing others without offering any solutions. That’s also how you’ll gradually earn more respect from the community.

As for the proposal itself, I personally don’t want to go through another full GTU nomination process. I hope the GTU members can coordinate and agree on directly nominating two candidates, then move it to Snapshot for a community vote. AIP-12 was passed three months ago—do we really want to spend another three months on this? And then another three months? Where does it end?

7
  1. For a DAO without money, the priority of security is not high
    Silk Zylo, two Westerners, bz Logan, two Easterners, the possibility of being connected is extremely low, and the cost of doing evil is very high. I’m not worried.
  2. The dissatisfaction and patience of the community have reached their limit, and the number of participants is decreasing. Obviously, no one is willing to spend time on too specific design work, and we can’t even see the figures of Silk and BZ anymore.
  3. Solve problems during the process, gradually iterate and improve, rather than considering all situations from the beginning.
  4. This forum discussion method is extremely inefficient, and the efficiency of work between countries and enterprises has long been eliminated. Have you ever worked in such a lazy and time deprived “company”?
    The designers of the system themselves do not have a sense of time, and they also choose what is beneficial to themselves in the selection of information
8

I made my points while opposing your proposal, but now it seems that you are not paying attention to those points, and here I would like to emphasize that electing multi-signatories in the absence of constraints and a selection system is extremely risky.
As a simple example, if three multi-signatories colluded to transfer funds from the treasury to their own private wallets, and those multi-signatories were anonymous then there would be nowhere to be found. If such a scandal were to occur token prices would plummet, all token holders would suffer losses, and Assange’s reputation would take a direct hit. The only ones who ultimately gain are the colluding multi-signers.
Of course DAO decisions are made collectively, and if everyone is willing to risk their own self-interest at the expense of a potential attacker then let it happen!

9

So how do we make sure that no more people from the same communities and organizations join Multisign? How do we make sure no more anonymous people join? Without rules, a lot of things are easier to break.

10

  1. Which three of the two Easterners and two Westerners would conspire to steal 198eth from the treasury? SilkNoa, Zylo, and bz? Is Logan and BZ combined with Zylo? Does Zylo agree? Aren’t they afraid of being arrested by the police? Logically speaking, there is no possibility.
    Once governance are properly managed, we’ll work on resolving this issue. not now.

  2. Is there any project in the crypto industry that is poorer than us? Steal what?

    .A sharp drop in prices? Look at the current market value of 1.1 million, it’s almost going to zero and even plummeting?

    Has anyone bought Assange’s coins in the cryptocurrency circle? They all think $Justice is dog poop and has a very poor reputation.

    Will Assange still suffer damage to his reputation because of $Justice? No, he’s already affected his reputation because of $Justice. Does Assange have a position in the cryptocurrency industry?

  3. Through this proposal, I have probably created a portrait of you, unrealistic and lacking in realism, with an inexplicable sense of superiority as a $justice holder. Fear of traffic accidents has turned you into a computer-bound shut-in who avoids going out.

  4. Looking at the daily trading volume of $Justice and the negative coverage of AssangeDAO in the crypto community can heal your $Justice holder superiority;

    As for you being afraid of traffic accidents and not daring to go out, @Gabriel can help you because he often flies

    Lacking a sense of reality, you can only listen more to the voices of the community

1 Like
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I understand your concerns, but you always make unrealistic assumptions. At this moment, only a handful of people are truly active and still strongly believe in the DAO — you, Sudongpo, Alex, Zylo, Gabriel, and myself. That’s just six people.

Among us, Zylo is already a multisig signer. Gabriel isn’t one yet, but if he’s willing, I’m sure no one would oppose his nomination. That leaves just one more spot to be filled from the remaining four of us. Whether it ends up being you, Sudongpo, Alex, or myself — I genuinely believe there is no chance of collusion or foul play between the new signer and the existing ones.

In this context, I feel it’s unnecessary to overcomplicate the process with too many rules and restrictions. What we need now is to move quickly and fill the proposer and multisig signer roles so the DAO can function properly again.

As Su said, once the forum has over 100 active users per day and $JUSTICE has thousands of holders, that will be the right time to introduce more robust governance frameworks. But right now, simplicity and momentum are what we need most.

12

币价都跌成狗了，还担心别人偷这两百个e？？别捣乱了

13

This design is close to perfect, but who can realize this utopian world? The Assange Dao is now abandoned, with no money, no people, no technology, and only a few mouths left, and they are not very willing to speak. Therefore, the Assange family is responsible. This community is in chaos. The longer the chaos lasts, the greater the reputation of Mr. Assange. Using blockchain to issue coins to raise funds to save Mr. Assange is an international event. Now Mr. Assange is free, but only the Assange Dao has been abandoned. This is heartbreaking!

14

半年了，还是这个鸟样半年了，还是停滞不前

15

When there are calls from the community to address governance, a real governance program is presented and no one discusses it. Instead it is the desire to implement a list of extra signatories on the basis of no governance. This puzzles me.

@sudongpo is similarly calling for governance first. But it seems from his expression that he wants to fix the token price first, not the real lack of governance.
I’d say Logan’s proposal is a proposal for staff appointments, not governance.

16

治理怎么去治理？平台是来讨论的，不是一直让你来反驳的。你那么厉害你的治理方案呢？也没有见你拿出来什么好的方案。dao现在停滞不前就是因为你们的存在，垃圾 不可理喻 做不到的事情就不要去承诺，

17

Don’t talk to this person. 35 is a fool who has no sense of reality. He doesn’t respond to you about real things, but keeps playing word games and talking about perfect solutions that have no possibility of realization. He is a complete fool.This proposal is shit at this stage, the cumbersome requirements make it impossible for anyone to participate.

18

Through your series of statements it appears that you are not in favor of governance, you are not in favor of public asset security, even you don’t support preventing the next E from appearing in the multisign, maybe you are in favor of people you know well or even you controlling the DAO and doing as you wish.