This proposal asks the AssangeDAO community to decide whether the Consensus Unit veto power should remain, be modified, or be removed. The veto was originally established to protect Julian Assange’s interests and ensure that the DAO’s actions remained aligned with his values.
Since Julian Assange has now regained his freedom, community members have differing views on whether this veto mechanism is still necessary. This proposal provides the community with three voting options to determine the future governance structure regarding the veto.
2. Context & Motivation
The veto power was introduced at the formation of AssangeDAO to:
Safeguard Julian Assange’s safety, reputation, and legal situation.
Ensure that the DAO’s proposals and decisions remain aligned with his values.
Today, the community holds differing opinions:
Some believe the veto was only necessary while Julian was imprisoned.
Others think the veto remains an important safeguard against mission drift.
Some believe only Julian himself ,not family members should hold veto authority.
A clear community decision is now required to define whether the veto mechanism should continue, be modified, or be fully removed.
3. Proposal Details
Voting Options (select one):
Option
Description
Option 1: Keep veto power unchanged
The current Consensus Unit veto remains as is.
Option 2: Remove family veto power, keep Assange veto
Only Julian Assange may exercise veto power; family members cannot exercise veto.
Option 3: Remove veto power entirely
No individual or group holds veto rights; Snapshot votes become final authority.
Implementation Notes:
Option 1: No changes; governance remains as currently structured.
Option 2: Update governance documents to reflect Julian-only veto; establish verification process for Julian’s authorization if needed.
Option 3: Remove veto references from governance documents; Snapshot votes become binding.
4. Risks & Mitigation
Risk
Mitigation
Mission drift if veto removed
Strengthen the DAO mission statement; establish a non-veto Values Steward group to provide guidance.
Centralization if veto kept
Require public transparency and explanation whenever veto is exercised.
5. Alignment with Mission
This proposal does not alter AssangeDAO’s mission or values. It ensures that governance structure regarding veto rights is clearly defined, aligned with current community sentiment, and continues to support Julian’s principles.
6. Governance Notes
The proposal does not affect the DAO’s broader governance mechanisms beyond veto power.
The Consensus Unit retains its role where applicable; any future adjustments to veto rights must be made via separate Snapshot proposal.
Ensures continuity and clarity in DAO decision-making processes.
Good, we should also clarify the members (Just Gabriel and Stella, Assange’s wife I believe).
Also we must clarify if we choose that sole veto power rests with Assange himself, that in case he is incapacitated (Severe illness, imprisoned or passes away) that the veto power moves to Stella and Gabriel (until another community vote to remove it).
And we should not put this up for vote until the mission has been clarified. For example if the DAO chooses to move away from Assange focused mission, it makes sense to absolutely remove the consensus unit entirely. Or if the DAO remains Assange focused + Assange value focused, it may make sense (to me at least), to change the veto power to be solely on Assange.
The proposal is excellent. This has been a focus of attention for months. G has been elected by the community as Assange’s DAO’s multiple signatory and has entered the core of community building. The previous consensus unit was established in the context of rescuing Mr. Assange. Now that Mr. Assange is free and the community’s mission has been accomplished, the consensus unit should be dissolved, which is beneficial to the community’s development. We should move forward.
I don’t see an urgent need for this proposal to go ahead before at least two new technical/marketing type projects are up and running.
The DAO has approved AIP 3 and AIP 12 for the Consensus Unit to remain. I think its very important to keep a connection to the Assange Family, with a focus on aligned projects. I can’t see the DAO evolving if it doesn’t maintain a relationship. Although there have been concerns, Gabriel has shown that the family remain interested. I think the DAO has to show that it can get a project up and running first.
I think the DAO should focus in the meantime on AIP 13, AIP 16, the mission statement being finalised and the new treasury proposal first, because those just have to be done and this doesn’t have to be done yet.
I want to be really clear about the issue I have with removing the veto, or with Option 2 where only Julian can use it.
Now that Julian is out, he’s not sitting in Discord watching proposals or checking Snapshot. He’s rebuilding his life and his privacy. He’s not going to be plugged into governance tools, notifications, or multisig actions. So creating a “Julian-only veto” sounds good on paper, but in practice it means there’s no way for him to actually exercise it. It becomes a power that exists only in theory.
If you’re taking the veto away from family and leaving it only to Julian - while also knowing he can’t and won’t be actively monitoring proposals - then you’re really just removing it altogether. We should be honest about that.
And if the DAO decides to remove the veto entirely, then I think it needs to be said: you can’t keep calling it AssangeDAO if Julian has no actual protective mechanism or governance connection. The name, the origin story, the mission - all of that was built around protecting Julian and advancing the principles tied to his case. If the DAO wants to go in a new direction without any safeguard for him, that’s fine, but it should be transparent about that and call itself something else.
To be clear, this isn’t about control or centralisation. There are plenty of ways to prevent abuse or overreach if people are worried about that. Transparency requirements, limits on when a veto can be invoked, public explanations, etc.
Either Julian has a real, usable safeguard, or the DAO shouldn’t operate under his name. A veto he can’t physically exercise is the same as no veto. Let’s just be honest and design governance around reality, not symbolism.
I understand your concern,You previously mentioned setting up the Perpetual AssangeDAO Fund for the AssangeDAO Award, with the final decision on recipients made by Julian himself. I’m curious ,through what channel would he announce his final decision?
The same channel could also be used for exercising a veto.He doesn’t need to follow every single update in the community, If there were ever a proposal that could negatively affect him, you could privately reach out to him and make him aware. I also trust the community would not put forward any proposal or action that would harm Julian.
In practice, I believe he would exercise the veto far less frequently than he would announce the final recipients of the AssangeDAO Award.
Should the consensus mechanism fail to remove Gabriel and given that Gabriel holds multisig authority, this entity will effectively transform into Gabriel DAO. This creates a clear conflict of interest that ultimately jeopardizes community interests - for instance, Gabriel could exercise veto power over the recovery of remaining WHS funds while the community lacks any overriding veto mechanism to counter such decisions.
Until the outstanding 3,681 ETH is returned to the DAO treasury, the contractual relationship of rights and obligations remains in force. The community is under no obligation to change its name, and all requests from Gabriel regarding rebranding will receive no response from our community.
1）Since you stated that Assange cannot participate in community affairs, yet previously mentioned that treasury staking rewards would be used for his designated projects—isn’t this contradictory?
Why would Assange personally agree to allocate staking proceeds to sponsor projects if not as a form of engagement with community matters?
Or does this merely represent your personal stance without Assange’s actual consent? This is the community’s pressing concern.
2）Since Assange’s release, the only person who should be included in the consensus unit is Julian himself. Gabriel has clearly not contributed enough to earn the community’s respect. You may inform Assange to exercise his veto power in scenarios that jeopardize his interests, but there’s no need to notify him on routine proposals.I find Gabriel 's justification utterly unconvincing.
I understand why people want to unlock the DAO and be more decentralised. I don’t have a problem with it or take it personally.
But two things that can’t be ignored.
A ‘Julian-only Veto’ is symbolic. It is just a reality that monitoring snapshot/forum is time consuming and not possible for Julian. So a safeguard he cannot realistically exercise is no safeguard at all.
If the DAO removes any real connection to Julian in governance the its hard to keep calling this ASSSANGEdao with a straight face. We have to be honest with the people who supported this because of Julian.
I’m not opposed to the evolution or to the community choosing a more decentralised model. But if the consensus unit is to be removed or reduced to some fiction, then the DAO needs to be prepared to evolve its name and narrative. Can’t claim a relationship that no longer exsists in practice.
I will only consider using the consensus unit veto in sittuations where proposals clearly risk harming Julian or turning the DAO into something that uses his name without protecting his values. Outside of that I’d rather see the community decides its own future with eyes wide open.
I agree with transferring the consensus unit to Mr. Assange, because our DAO was built on rescuing Assange. During the transition period, GB was only acting on behalf of Mr. Assange, but now that he is free, this power should be transferred. GB can no longer represent him unless Mr. Assange publicly states to the community that GB is acting on his behalf to execute the consensus unit. However, GB cannot unilaterally represent Mr. Assange without authorization; that would be illegal.
Gabriel, thank you for expressing your thoughts so openly. Your commitment to protecting Julian’s interests and ensuring the DAO operates with integrity has been essential since the very beginning. And it’s precisely because of this honesty that the discussion around the veto needs to be approached realistically.
The core issue is not about trust or intention — it’s about practicality. A safeguard only works if the person holding it can truly exercise it. You’ve been transparent that monitoring every proposal, snapshot vote, or forum discussion simply isn’t feasible for you. That’s understandable given everything on your plate, but it also means the veto becomes more symbolic than functional.
Transferring the veto back to Julian personally is not a step away from responsibility — it’s actually a return to authenticity. It ensures that the power exists where it has real meaning, not just on paper. It avoids creating a structure where your name is tied to a responsibility you cannot realistically fulfill, and it prevents the DAO from relying on a safeguard that doesn’t operate as intended.
Shifting the veto to Julian himself:
Respects your time and limitations instead of placing unrealistic expectations on you
Preserves the integrity of the governance design
Maintains the DAO’s connection to Julian in a way that is honest, direct, and meaningful
Prevents misunderstandings where the community assumes you are acting in a role that you cannot reasonably perform
Most importantly, this change does not increase burden on Julian — you already stated that you would only intervene in rare circumstances where proposals threaten him or distort his values. Returning the veto to him simply allows that principle to be upheld without a middle layer.
This is not about removing you from the process. It’s about ensuring the governance reflects reality rather than symbolism, and that your contribution remains aligned with what you can genuinely support.
By releasing the veto back to Assange himself, you help build a governance model that is transparent, honest, and structurally sound — and you reinforce the idea that this DAO should never claim responsibilities or connections that aren’t real in practice.
Your leadership has been valuable all along. Making this adjustment is just the next responsible step in ensuring the DAO can evolve without placing undue pressure on you or misrepresenting how decisions are made.
What is realistic for Julian? Could things be put on a delay before voting or implementation, or could things be scheduled to happen on a predictable schedule that he can work with?
If you would be monitoring anyway, couldn’t you simply help flag any potential issues for him? Zylo, who has a good history with WikiLeaks, could potentially do the same.
I believe granting Julian veto power requires consulting him directly. If we receive no response from him personally, or if he outright rejects the proposal, then this option becomes meaningless. It could also be described as a job where the community invites someone to participate. Without the other party’s consent, the work cannot proceed. Expecting someone else to do it for him is also unrealistic, as this does not align with any work participation system.
Shifting perspective, we could propose granting Elon Musk or Vitalik Buterin veto power. However, I believe they would likely not engage at all, making this merely wishful thinking. Moreover, each proposal would then require waiting for their potential veto decisions, significantly delaying time and hindering the DAO’s operational efficiency.
I believe Gabriel honestly informed Julian that he would not participate in the veto process and explained the reasons. Therefore, the proposal should align with reality to avoid futile efforts- because if we grant Julian veto power, he must make a decision on every proposal, and we may never receive a response from him- this prevents every proposal from being stalled by waiting for Julian’s response on whether to exercise his veto, thereby enabling the community to advance its agenda. And proposals made without his veto decision may constitute an invalid proposal.
(By the way, this is not about Julian needing a veto power, nor has he ever expressed a need for such a power. It is merely the unilateral desire of the proposal’s author to grant him this power.)
I think this is very reasonable, and the community would most likely accept such a statement via Gabriel if he is able to say that he’s communicated with Julian on it.
Yes, but I also explained the possibility that Julian might not respond at all.
Since his release from prison, Julian has never made any public statements, participated in any interviews, or engaged in any type of work. Even when attending public events in a personal capacity, he has refrained from speaking. I suspect this occasion will be no exception.
I should also note that a unilateral decision does not constitute mutual consent under the law. We can simply understand it as an invalid agreement.
Julian can’t go anywhere without the paparazzi filming him. If he speaks here it will be spread elsewhere. He obviously is not ready. Best to leave things the way they are and be mindful that the DAO carries his name which still links the DAO to its greatest achievement. That is enormously valuable and a privilege. If words simply need to be tidied up then the reality is Stella Assange and Jennifer Robinson are not active, have not been replaced, so the Consensus Unit is Gabriel Shipton, who represents Julian. Gabriel could be given a title if need be - if he is going to operate the Consensus Unit on his own - the Principal Guardian or Appointor rather than the “Consensus Unit”.