This covers many of the concern areas in the past and the veto powers seem appropriately explained. I believe this is the AIP 3 - the update would have to check the status of Stella Assange and Jennifer Robinson, if the GTU becomes an Alumini (CAU) group?Snapshot
For Treasury security financial consultants maybe required for certain proposals. The “alumini” I forsee should have input over particular treasury proposals and use their financial contacts for advice and provide the necessary feedback to the community? Or the community could decide to pay for this service. Not sure what the hourly rate would be.
Re social platforms - looks like Discord is full of spam these days. Although I prefer it to TG if it was moderated properly.
Re veto - will have to find a voting tool that would allow an “alumini” veto - a hybrid type or stick with snapshot but just complete Governance.
I also am of the opinion that the community does want the “consensus unit” retained. Not seeing alot of approval for removing the Assange tie in.
We proposed AIP12 after the suggestion by core team members to move to a new on-chain governance framework was fiercely debated, and there were calls by various community members to consider alternative proposals, not ours or not just ours. This was a valid concern. So, the idea behind AIP12 is to agree on a mechanism/process as to how to decide on the future of the DAO: which proposal(s) should be put before the community, how and what is needed to pass such proposals to be implemented?
So, where AIP12 (or an amendment thereof based on this discussion) passes, it only determines the process of how a new governance framework is adopted. It is not supposed to be the new governance framework.
Based on the discussion, I think we should make amendments to AIP12 and then vote on it.
I summarize the issues raised here:
(1) that the proposed AIP process would be the new governance process;
(1) that the GTU replaces the Consensus Unit, temporarily or long term;
(2) the membership of the GTU.
As to (1), the process of AIP 12 is supposed to only be used to agree on a new governance but does not represent the new governance itself.
As to (2), the original idea was for the GTU to temporarily replace the Consensus Unit to decide about which governance proposals should be put before the community to vote on. Given that many here favour the Consensus Unit to not be replaced, what alternative do you propose?
As to (3), in case AIP12 with a form of GTU goes ahead, there is a need to update the membership of the GTU given that Stella R Magnet stepped back, and other proposed members, including myself, have been less active. Who should those people be?
The AIP 12 discussed a technical working team who haven’t provided the feedback on Tally to date? Who were that team? I have no idea about who the technical experts are at this DAO.
I think people want to see a hybrid on-chain voting system with some authority (Assange place-holder) to knock back dangerous proposals - not just a time delay (such as in a completely decentralised voting system) or the temporary measure proposed in the transition phase (re pre-approval of governance proposals). Perhaps rigorous pre-testing of proposals for vulnerabilities by experts is the way to go permanently in the future? But that is slow but perhaps necessary? Would the multi sigs stay and be timely if they were paid for their time, instead of being volunteers??? Or should the DAO pay for an external service to provide the rigorous pre-approval when a big treasury proposal is made?
Also if our new mission includes an Assange Award and a Grants program for whistleblower support we WILL need an “alumini” to give those projects the prestige/gravitas those projects deserve. I don’t think the AssangeDAO can afford to lose its ties with its original players.
Its very difficult to make plans when the budget is unknown and Julian’s thoughts are unknown.
Also as for nominations for a transition team - I suggest before names are thrown around that those people are asked first privately if they’re available.
My understanding of GTU is that it is intended to replace the consensus unit and to exercise governance over the DAO. I recognize that proposals needs to be managed to avoid attacks on governance, the treasury, and Assange’s reputation. But I still have the following questions about the GTU:
How to ensure that the criteria for selection of members are met, especially when among the proposed personnel there is still the presence of people who are completely anonymous and who have collaborated with the saboteurs who have been attacking Julian Assange for a long time.
It is not ensured that long-silent persons are replaced in time to keep the DAO alive and that members who deviate or betray the DAO can be de-listed.
In addition attackers can still bribe the GTU through infiltration and payoffs to pass their proposals.
How the voices of the ordinary members are heard by the initiator of the proposal, in this model it seems that the initiator only has to listen to the voices of the GTU members and can ignore the opinions of the ordinary members.
So in my opinion GTU is a more bureaucratic and dangerous organization than the multi-signature system.
Also how does the consensus unit work in a coexisting state? It seems that all proposals are modified by GTU before submission.
Did you check out my comments on changing the GTU to Community Alumni Unit? What are your thoughts on this?
GTU and Consenus Unit serve separate functions. They co exist. If the consensus unit were asked if they were removed permanently by members would they allow the DAO to be called the AssangeDAO - my bet would be - they’d say no? In fact - does not Gabriel Shipton, imply so above?
I don’t know why I did not read the document properly first time around, but I didn’t think it said the GTU was replacing the Assange/Shipton presence - it was just a temporary work group, which included some alumini and multi sigs.
So the AIP 12should be altered to reflect that IMO.
I think the discussion here is only on AIP12. Yes, Amir and a few devs were working on an implementation based on Tally in June/July. However, there was a lot of confusion about its implementation and the community voting on whether it wanted that new framework or not. AIP12 is not about that tech proposal. Its a proposal to agree a process for everyone to suggest proposals for governance frameworks. All proposals as to governance should come AFTER AIP12 or some similar proposals is passed.
I am unsure who the saboteurs are you are referring to. Also, just to be clear, AIP12 does not propose to establish the GTU on a long term basis. The GTU was to select governance proposals proposed by the community that then the community will vote on. So the steps would be the community proposes the governance frameworks to be adopted and the GTU selects suitable proposals that are aligned with Assange. The community then votes on which proposal to implement. The moment the community has selected a governance framework, the GTU has fulfilled its purpose and retires.
Delete the phrase - “In place of the Consensus Unit” from the AIP 12 document - causes confusion.
Reason: The GTU is a working group. Its not replacing the Consensus Unit. Gabriel is opposed to that wording and will veto.
Amend - Nominee section - “Do they have Twitter?” Is Twitter/x a requirement? Or should it be “Do they have social media accounts?” If so - the nomination should include the person’s social media account profiles.
Add - The nominee should also have clear written English capability (using translation tools is fine) and relevant qualifications and work experience. The nomination should include disclosure of their country of origin/residence. (E clearly lied about this and this cannot be allowed to recur).
And refer to point 5, below.
Delete one sentence re Tally - this following sentence appearing in the Background section should be deleted as any alternate models incorporating a consensus veto have not yet been compared. “There is a clear need for the Open Zeppelin governance upgrade to be formatted into a proposal to be evaluated by the community, and there is is a team working on developing that proposal.”
When the anon technical group write that draft proposal (who are they?) and it is subsequently approved - then it should be considered as a “clear need” - but it shouldn’t be treated as locked in beforehand, as implied in AIP 12. If this technical proposal is not part of the AIP proposal there is no reason to include that sentence.
AIP12 really only needs to refer to the general concept of a decentralised model for voting on proposals, at this stage. Specifics, come later. That is, the transition team would consider retaining snapshot and existing multisigs/proposers (or tidy it) or preferably move to a decentralised model based upon community responses to the ratifcation of the metaproposal.
Suggestion to get this meta proposal completed… - I’m not opposed to hiring an external expert, a known public person to be included on the GTU, for this purpose, if there are not suitable and/or available candidates nominated from within this DAO. If the GTU is temporary, we need governance to be completed with proficiency and speed. So maybe an amendment to the section on nominees, if there is a shortfall from within?
Reason: Going by the slim number of registered users here on the forum - it could be practical and necessary to widen the nominee application process. Note - No candidate nominations put forward to date.
If the GTU is only temporary then I would like to see the “in place of consensus unit” statement removed and the expiration conditions noted to prevent being taken out of context.
The other thing I am referring to is BZ, as a member of the community he has targeted treasury funds, tried to submit proposals to use them several times over the years, and hates members who disagree with him. I don’t understand why anyone vouched for him to be in GTU, the fact is no one knows his real name, lives there, has seen his face. He is a completely anonymous and nowhere to be found person who is perfectly capable of avoiding all responsibility after any damage is done. Lately he’s even been working with Emma Best, which means that his entry into any management is tantamount to letting Emma’s will be done there.
These are evidence of bz colluding with Emma best and posted by Emma best herself on the TG channel that silke as owned. Not sure how you would comment on that. But obviously such a dangerous character should not be vouched for!
I agree with your concerns.but this is just a transitional phase, I believe our process should be simplified. The Consensus Unit should still retain the highest authority to ensure that the community does not harm Assange’s reputation. We should select active community members holding more than 50M or 100M $justice tokens and have them stake their tokens to ensure they act in the community’s best interest.
Once the DAO is back on track and we attract more capable people, we can then appoint those individuals to take on these important roles. In the meantime, if the Consensus Unit feels that a GTU member is behaving inappropriately, he can request the community to re-elect members at any time.
Perhaps my idea is too simple, but I want to emphasize once again this is just a transitional phase.Given the current state of the community, We really shouldn’t stay here too long.
If we went with Tally it mentioned something like 1% share to become a proposal author.
Part of being nominated and eventually elected though would be to particpate here. Nominees should comprehend this - that would be a test!!! This statement in the AIP 12 should be acknowledged in otherwords:
“Instead, all official community and governance discussions should take place on the forum once it is reactivated, as that was the previously established community governance channel for deliberation”
So the current proposal is
1.6 AIP-12 Templates
1.6.1 Governance Transition Unit (GTU) Nomination Template
Please create a new topic on the forum and follow this template for nominating or self-nominating a GTU member.
Nominee
Who is the nominee? Do they have a Twitter?
Contribution History
Describe the contribution history of the nominee to the AssangeDAO. Note that this must be beyond financial contribution.
Vouching
Which of the current proposed GTU members has vouched for this nominee? Nominee must be vouched by at least 2 GTU members.
General Statement
Provide a statement of intent of why this nominee is best equipped to be a part of the GTU and examples that display how they understand Julian Assange’s values and struggles.
Currently, the community has very few active members, and with these nomination requirements, it’s almost impossible to select effective members—especially when it comes to describing the contribution history of nominees to the AssangeDAO. How many members can genuinely claim to have made contributions to the DAO?
The reason the DAO has been in a state of paralysis is that token holders lack authority. Therefore, I hope we can give token holders more power to influence the direction of community governance, as long as it doesn’t harm Assange’s reputation. GTU members should be selected with this point in mind.
It’s been over a month since the forum was restored,Discussions about API 12 have been going on for more than two weeks.Can we make amendments to API12 based on the existing discussions and vote on it now?