Pls read Lord Vitalik’s latest article “Soulbound”. Why I think full community decision voting is likely to be a nightmare.
请阅读V神的最新文章“灵魂的绑定”。为什么我认为完全的社区化决策投票很可能是噩梦。
If the goal is for governance power to be widely distributed, then transferability is counterproductive as concentrated interests are more likely to buy the governance rights up from everyone else.
If the goal is for governance power to go to the competent, then transferability is counterproductive because nothing stops the governance rights from being bought up by the determined but incompetent.
If you take the proverb that “those who most want to rule people are those least suited to do it” seriously, then you should be suspicious of transferability, precisely because transferability makes governance power flow away from the meek who are most likely to provide valuable input to governance and toward the power-hungry who are most likely to cause problems.
As a counterpoint, please read about the “liquid democracy” form of governance, which is almost the exact opposite of what he proposes.
Moreover the whole point of transferability, is that it allows price signals about what the market values, and it also reduces the problems with “sunk costs”. I.E. if the DAO is not performing well because its being mismanaged, the ability of the person to vote to leave with their assets by selling those assets, or to replace management with better ones with the goal of improving the value of the token, actually benefit the future of the DAO.
If the goal is for governance power to go to the competent, then transferability is counterproductive because nothing stops the governance rights from being bought up by the determined but incompetent.
Nothing stops the determined but also competent from also buying up shares. This is just like shareholder activism, there are those who buy up shares who are professional hedge funds looking to improve share price, and there are those who buy shares who wish to advance social causes but aren’t business savvy.