Let's fork the DAO to decentralise governance

Following up on this post: Immediate Next Steps for AssangeDAO

and given the governance challenges outlined there and the empty treasury of the AssangeDAO other than the NFT which market value is unclear, I would like to suggest a FORK of the DAO with the minting of a new token, distributed to all contributors, with a decentralised governance independent from the centralised governance elements currently present.

I also suggest to control right save the NFT, hoping that the current multi sig holders will transfer to the decentralised fork the NFT, since if they are cypherpunks, they should support community initiatives and distributed consensus. If they don’t, I still believe that the NFT which has value will be the one supported by the community, and if the fork gets traction, then it would be this one.

Please suggest ways to create liquidity for the token in the fork and build an actionable treasury.

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Hi F - What is the purpose of a fork? I would suggest to make a proposal here of how you envisage the governance of the AssangeDAO. I believe all multisig members would be particularly happy to step aside and to find a better governance structure than that which had been envisaged. The Justice token was minted only yesterday after the raise finished - as was promised during the raise and the transition to decentralised governance has only just begun. Also, as you probably know, Juicebox does allow minting new Justice tokens, if this is what the DAO thinks is the way forwarded. There is currently a proposal being prepared by members of the JuiceboxDAO which allows to allow the bonding curve ratio between Juicebox tokens and ETH to be raised from currently 75% to 95%. There is a good chance the proposal will pass. This would mean, we can exchange our Juicebox tokens for 95% of the ETH taken as a fee by Juicebox during the raise.

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The issue more than just the multi-sig, its also the “community moderators”. We currently do not know anything that was going on behind doors, so there is an absence of confidence that there will not be gatekeeping by 1) the mult-sig 2) the “community moderators” 3) the “AIP editors” 4) the Assange family (after who the org is named).

The correct method in my mind would be to:

  1. change the name of the org, if assange family is no longer involved in management.

  2. create a legal entity i.e. nonprofit or LLC, to legally protect individuals involved.

  3. new election of board members, taken from volunteers, to oversee the project.

  4. appointment by the board members of separate volunteers, to be “community moderators” or management

  5. voting on proposals on the new mission statement, and project of the organization.

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As stated, multi-sig is happy to step aside. Creating an LLC may, in theory open the door to more action against you than it protects, just an FYI. Even a nonprofit binds you in multiple ways and would need to be thoroughly discussed in terms of securities and vulnerabilities, as well as what entities would head such an organizarion or arm and how the DAO would go about enforcing that.

You need to avoid organizing yourselves anywhere within US tax jurisdiction because of how crypto is currently classified (and would be wise given the general purpose of the AssangeDAO).

As far as a new board etc. That is fine and well within the rights of the community, and I think generally always the intent of those developing this (I am one of said central developers).

But should we really be concerned with removing the Assange Family from the AssangeDAO, or rebranding it entirely? Considering the Assange Family’s sole purpose is to veto harmful propositions and it is because of them that this DAO exists at all, and considering Assange himself has expressed a desire for this DAO to continue, It seems like decentralizing that governance structure absolutely in one go, opens the door for a lot of manipulation in terms of community objectives that may fall well outside the original intent (which would likely be better served by creating an entirely new DAO, rather than attempting to subsume this one under an entirely different purpose).

So if we are looking for new direction, which is good, we should strive to adhere still to core principles set forward here.

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It seems like decentralizing that governance structure absolutely in one go, opens the door for a lot of manipulation in terms of community objectives that may fall well outside the original intent (which would likely be better served by creating an entirely new DAO, rather than attempting to subsume this one under an entirely different purpose).

Legally speaking, once the org has distributed the tokens, just like shares in a publicly traded company, the shareholders have complete autonomy to decide the direction of the organization, and an executive team has no right to prevent shareholders form going in any direction they want, doing so would violate the fiduciary duty to the shareholders.

Regarding U.S. Jurisdiction, I do not know enough about the current US securities regulations, though if I wanted to read up on all of the law and case law, i would certainly be able to form an opinion on that. However I was under the impression that if members of the US would like to donate to an organization and have that donation be tax deductible, or if the organization solicits donations from individuals who are in the United States, there must be a non profit organization. Moreover to solicit business from individuals as a collective entity, the organization has to be business license. Moreover legal organizations are empowered to litigate matters on behalf of their members in a court, whereas an “unincorporated association” does not have the “legal standing” to sue on anyone’s behalf.

*edited for formatting.

Complete autonomy doesnt necessitate the removal of safeguards in place that help preserve a core mission under which participants negotiated their original membership.
It gives that right, it does not demand its function.

I believe that function to be detrimental to the overall objectives of the community, which gathered under the banner of Assange, in order to raise funds for his legal battle.
I think that to substantially alter our focal point and structure to the point of entirely rebranding ourselves and our main objective, seems counter intuitive and harmful to our overall community structure; which was built on those tenants.

I would sooner see us open up new governance boards under the auspices of still working with the family, in some fashion, and utilizing that connection to further the goals of this DAO, whose stated purpose certainly extends beyond just fundraising. They give a legitimacy to our actions on a public stage, and, being deeply involved in it firsthand, offer us an excellent window into what the fight for free speech needs most.

Again, its not up to the company executives, its up to shareholders to decide, and the executives of a company, have no ability to dictate to the shareholders, that’s basic law. If the executives try to limit the power of the shareholders, they open themselves up personally to a shareholder derivative lawsuit, alleging that they violated their fiduciary duty to shareholders / owners. There are other common law rules, such as the “rule against perpetuities” that have a similar effect nullifying any attempt to bind shareholders in this fashion.

I hardly think saying “nullifying all safeguards is a bad idea” is the equivalent of binding anything at an executive level.

I maintain that it would, as a simple opinion, be detrimental for the DAO community to choose that course.

safeguards from whom, against whom?
Shareholders cant be safeguarded against themselves
Executives cant be safeguarded against shareholders

The only safeguard that is required, is the AssangeDAO name, but the Assange family cannot dictate how the shareholders want to proceed themselves, only demand that the name be changed to something else, just like when some businesses removed the name “Trump” from their condo building.

Of course shareholders can be safeguarded against themselves. Redundancy of security is common sense, not the opposite.
The idea of abandoning the conceptual origin of the DAO would likewise cost in overall members and vectors of support that the official title gives us.

We are uniquely positioned on the field right now, and the community would be fiscally wise to take advantage of that, rather than abandoning it.

And for an example, an intelligence agency uses limitless wallets to purchase tokens and by inorganic majority vote does harm to assange’s reputation or harm to the dao. The list goes on. Without a veto mechanism in place, that is highly likely.*

There have been multiple attempts to derail this DAO and what it stands for, but I maintain that the true majority would be in favor of continuing to embrace Julian’s vision and likely not ready to abandon that just yet. At least, not entirely.

If we want to be successful as a DAO, we should strongly capitalize on the association and continue to forge ahead, and use it to our advantage in raising liquidity for $Justice and continuing to create vehicles for social change.

At least, fiscally speaking, that makes far more sense I humbly think.

Of course shareholders can be safeguarded against themselves. Redundancy of security is common sense, not the opposite.

“redundancy of security is common sense”

Secure from what?

The idea of abandoning the conceptual origin of the DAO would likewise cost in overall members and vectors of support that the official title gives us.

How does that actually change “security”, considering that Assange’s name is a target, for nation state threat actors?

There have been multiple attempts to derail this DAO and what it stands for,

The whole point of a DAO, is that a DAO is not centralized, and autonomy precludes ideological conformity to some one persons or small group vision.

If the DAO decided tomorrow as a collective to take all its assets, and literally burn them or figuratively flush them down the toilet, the decision must be obeyed regardless of its “common sense”.

The thing is, in any DAO, anyone have the right of voice and exit. You can choose exit but you cannot expect everyone to follow you.

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