(Idea) My 11 Speed Proposals drafts on Governance

Yep and one proposal could be to have a group of elected members by the community and that could represent the community wishes and vote on finished proposals in a Discord pre-voting channel. Have it “open” to everyone might be difficult since almost impossible to measure what is 30% of Discord members since not everyone is active and that voting can also be manipulated by bots. Someone proposed this system that is what some DAOs use for temperature checks (JuiceBox DAO for exemple)

My proposal to be voted now with Governance is:

Snapshot proposals Temperature check?
a) 21 active members selected by the community to review and aprove snapshots (quorum 11 votes, above 50% vote wins if quorum reached)
b) 13 active members selected by the community to review and aprove the snapshot (quorum 7 votes, above 50% vote wins if quorum reached)
c) none of the above - discuss further

no cex will ever list a junk token. check out houbi review

Screenshot_1

  1. that is Huobi Research not Huobi CEX
  2. they got almost all facts wrong and said a lot of things that simply aren’t true (a research group that doesn’t do a proper research, so take your own conclusions about how valid their opinion really is)
  3. https://twitter.com/gate_io/status/1499297292012109829
  4. have a good day and leave your FUD outside!
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c) 9 with 5 to confirm

Nice we can to moon
We can to moon
Darkfi love u

Can you please explain why the 665ETH wallet sold out all the justice tokens, is this a dev wallet, or is it a neurotic person who donates $2.2 million?

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team/devs didn’t get any tokens. they only got tokens according to the quantity of eth they contributed on juicebox like anyone else. all the minted tokens match eth contributions in juicebox during the funding cycles.

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no idiot donates 665ETH and then dumps justice, unless they’re accomplices

[image]

I want to talk mainly about risk, because of my job, risk are prioritized in everything I do. I think prudence is the guarantee of success.

  1. Multisig and Snapshot Authors should at least understand and abide by procedures and rules. They cannot arbitrarily or skip some rules to advance the next step. If these people don’t know how to comply, they won’t even be on the list of candidates.

  2. No matter the total number of Multisig, it is best that no more than 2 people from the same group/team/family. If there are so many people from the same group/team/family, it is easy to make a deal in private to withdraw money from the treasury. In view of this Multisig should also have a background check.

  3. The choice of Snapshot Author should be reconsidered. There should be a review system for proposals before deciding who is the author, and there should be a written test for Snapshot Authors, which should test their familiarity with the process and system. Hurrying to change Snapshot Authors may lead to favorable proposals only for a single group/team/family on the snapshot.

  4. Snapshot parameters are recommended to stay with the current ones and can be adjusted upwards as the community grows, as the larger the sample the more accurate the results.

3 Likes

I suggest that we vote directly on the different options of a governance system, as the current question may cause a confirmation bias. I feel the question on voting system warrants a separate thread here.

I think this question follows from the decision on point 10. Where the outcome to 10 is that proposers can be anyone with a certain number of tokens, point 9 is moot (as there won’t be any Moderators/Authors then).

I think a further question should be (and potentially deserving its own thread) is:
Should the AssangeDAO adopt Safesnap (Zodiac Reality Module) to allow for permissionless on-chain execution of off-chain snapshot votes? (thus reducing the role of multisig signers, as well as their potential liabilities). The inclusion brings in new attack vectors (e.g. monitoring of question resolution on reality.eth), but the matter should at least be considered.

I would like to add, that it may also be worth considering, whether the methods for generating snapshot options should resemble something like this.

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We can vote on multiple proposals at once.
We can perform multi-signature execution on multiple proposals at once.

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Regarding the first question, the quorum on voting, I’ve check many other DAO project and they don’t set a quorum in voting.
Base on the research, In my opinion we can set the quorum to 1%, according to statistical theory, only three out of a hundred voted and the others abstained, Voting results are still valid.

The snapshot proposal should be :
a) Should the Snapshot parameters of using traditional token-weighted governance with Quorum (3.5B tokens), Duration 3 days, 2 days pending time stay the same for now? (Above 50% vote wins if quorum reached)

b)Should the Snapshot parameters of using traditional token-weighted governance with Quorum is 1% (170M tokens), Duration 3 days, 1 days pending time(cooldown period)

or any other options

I think having a quorum ensures that no proposals pass that were somehow overlooked by the community (as for example there are too many proposals that persons have to bring their attention to). I do however agree that we could reduce the quorum to a lower number, but 1% seems very low. I would find 10% more appropriate, as the AssangeDAO community is made up of people with very different convictions, and so there is a high risk a proposal would be passed that goes against what members want.

2 Likes
  1. How many Multisigs should we have? (highest % wins)
    b) 7 with 4 to confirm

  2. Should the current multisigs stay multisigs (if they have not yet resigned)
    b) no - let’s vote on all new multisigs - they will all be replaced (unless voted in)

  3. Confirm Multisig requirements
    -Not a US citizen/resident or US tax resident
    -Multisig cannot not have more than 2 persons. from the same country
    -Must either be a relatively well known/reputable person or has been active in the DAO
    a) Agree

7.Should the multisigs (or remaining multisigs that need to be voted in) be nominated on the forum and then voted in to confirm?
a) Yes - let the community nominate mulitsigs on the forum and then vote them in

b) no - we should discuss further

Because the total number of votes that can be eligible to vote is currently only 13+ billion (20% is 2.6 billion), excluding coins without redeem and those on cex. So the threshold should be about 2.6 billion.

因为目前可以有投票资格的总票数只有130+亿(20%是26亿),除掉没有redeem的和在cex上的币。因此阈值应该是26亿。

OK thoughts on Quadratic Voting - to implement this it seems we would need some sort of ID verification system so I don’t think it’s a good idea at this time as people in AssangeDAO would want to remain anonymous.

  1. Should the Assange Family choose half (rounding down) of the multisigs?
    a) Yes (2 if 5 multisig, 3 if 7 multisig, 4 if 9 multisig)
    b) No - entirely nominated and voted in by community

For this one, definitely choose no. Because the family already have the veto power. The DAO has already suffered greatly because many view our DAO hasn’t follow the DAO spirit - too much control by the Family. I understand why the family insisted the veto power. But we can’t give them too much power because that won’t be a DAO.

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