Core Mission and Questions
- What is the core mission of the DAO?
- Define the relation with Assange.
Most people seem to feel the DAO should maintain some relation with Assange, but the degree to which the DAO is focused solely on Assange’s defence is the core question.
Many people feel strongly that Assange is the centerpiece for freedom of speech in the world, and the DAO should focus on Assange.
Others feel the DAO has raised $50m for Assange, and there are other freedom fighters who deserve justice. Additionally they feel the name of Assange is befitting for the noble causes of truth and justice.
This is a core question that should be addressed since it directly impacts questions surrounding the governance structure.
Whether the DAO expands its mission of justice or remains solely focused on Assange, many members feel strongly we should remain connected to Assange, as our original cause that defined the DAO.
Additional questions to be added are:
- Other options other than pure veto power?
- How members of the consensus unit could be made to step down if for example there are allegations of misconduct.
- Address the relation between AssangeDAO, Assange, Wikileaks, the family and Wau Holland foundation.
- How to ensure the consensus unit is taking correct decisions on behalf of Assange?
- The DAO has a substantial interest in Assange’s defence given the large donation.
- Is a direct line of communication possible such as videos, voice or text messages?
- Can the DAO communicate through Assange’s lawyer?
- Note: Gabriel assures me this is possible to setup if desired by the DAO.
- How long a proposal remains open to a veto.
The DAO should formally ask the consensus unit what the conditions they impose on the DAO are before moving forwards with this important question.
Additional questions are when the consensus unit would not exercise its veto power. Even people in favour of the maxbid want to see some safeguards against the absolute authority of the consensus unit. One possible proposal was having the veto power limited by a quorum of non-family multisig members to avoid conflicts of interest.
One proposal was replacing the consensus unit with the legal team of Assange which has a final say on all proposals.
There are allegations of uneven application of rules or outright censorship for anti-maxbid views that many people felt unfair.
To remedy this the community wants a clear system of rules with the usual rules of conduct, and a system of warnings, time-outs before applying bans. When the new rules are brought in, then everybody should be unbanned from Discord and the new rules applied from that point onwards.
There were also allegations against community member by several people from the Chinese community. Evidence should be brought forwards by all involved parties otherwise these remain unsubstantiated.
Questions on treasury, staking, liquidity and other income streams should be addressed post-governance and is outside the scope of this immediate power-transfer stage.
Many people felt we should not mint more JUSTICE and the DAO is bound by a covenant. To put this question to governance would undermine the economic foundations of the DAO. But this question requires more consideration.
Many people desire the multisig to be much larger, either 5 of 7, or 6 of 9 with snapshot elections for members.
Should there be a quorum? What should the quorum be?
Should there be a temperature check by the current set of authors?
How long proposals are visible before entering voting? Should it be 24 hours or one week?
How long is voting active for? 5 days? One week?
We should likely hold a community town hall for competing discussions in 3 weeks.
Official translation group to translate official announcement info with 6-10 people working part-time. Particularly into Chinese, given our large Chinese community.